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Dieser Beitrag wurde erstmals wie folgt veröffentlicht:  
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Druckversion – die allein zitierfähig ist – im Verhältnis zu diesem Ma-
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1. Introduction 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has handed down a 
number of important decisions interpreting the provisions of the Aarhus 
Convention relating to access to justice over the last years.
1
 The following 
contribution assesses first the content of the case law of the CJEU. Then, the 
implications of this case law for Switzerland as a non-Member State of the 
EU, but party state to the Convention are assessed. A number of different 
threads relating to different parts of Article 9 of the Convention can be iden-
tified in the Court’s case law and are subsequently addressed separately after 
a short overview over the topic of access to justice in the Aarhus Conven-
tion. 
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  The present contribution picks up and combines threads developed in earlier contribu-
tions on the case law of the European Court of Justice in environmental matters and  on 
the Aarhus Convention more specifically as well as on implications for Switzerland. 
The respective sources will be duly referred to throughout this article.  
Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Access to Justice 
2 
 
As the so-called third pillar of the Convention, access to justice stands 
next to access to environmental information and public participation in envi-
ronment-related procedures. The pertinent Article 9 provides in its first par-
agraph that states have to create judicial remedies that enable each individu-
al to bring a claim based on the right of access to information according to 
Article 4 of the Convention. Article 9 (2) requires access to justice to be 
granted in cases concerning decisions covered by Article 6 on public partici-
pation in environment-related decision-making. The public concerned are 
individuals either having a “sufficient interest” or alternatively “maintaining 
impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law of a Party 
requires this as a precondition”. Apart from such individuals, a right of ac-
tion is also to be granted to environmental associations that pursue environ-
mental interests and meet other requirements of the Convention.
2
 Article 9 
(3) provides that members of the public meeting the criteria laid down in 
national law must have access to administrative and judicial procedures to 
challenge acts and omissions contravening provisions of the national envi-
ronmental law in addition to the aforementioned rights of action. Lastly, 
Article 9 (4) specifies that all mentioned procedures have to provide “ade-
quate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and 
be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”. 
2. The Case Law of the CJEU 
The threads that can be identified in the case law of the Court concern the 
temporal scope of application of the provisions on access to justice, the case 
of specific legislative acts that ought to be excluded from the Convention’s 
obligations, interim relief, the range of pleas that can be brought forward for 
judicial review, the role of procedural errors, the notion of prohibitively ex-
pensive costs of proceedings, access to justice for environmental associa-
tions as granted under Article 9 (2) and 9 (3) of the Convention and the rele-
vance of the right to property where a permit has been annulled. 
                                                 
2
  Article 9 (2) third and fourth sentence. See on these requirements in more detail sec-
tions 2.7 and 2.8. 
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2.1. The temporal scope of application of provisions on access 
to justice 
In Gemeinde Altrip
3
 an administrative procedure had started before the 
end of the deadline for implementation of the pertinent predecessor provi-
sion of Article 11 of Directive 2011/92,
4
 while the resulting permit was only 
granted afterwards. The Court held that Article 11 could indeed be applied 
to “future effects”, but not to “legal situations that have arisen and become 
definitive under the old law”.5 The duty to conduct an environmental impact 
assessment itself had been found not to apply in the case of large-scale pro-
jects when the application for consent for a project had been formally lodged 
before the expiry of the implementing period, since neither such already 
complex procedures should be made even more cumbersome and time-
consuming by the Directive’s requirements nor should already established 
situations be affected thereby.
6
 However, for the Court this reasoning was 
not applicable to the specific requirement of Article 11, which only in-
creased the pre-existing risk of a project becoming the subject of contentious 
proceedings by improving access to a legal remedy.
7
 The mere practical ef-
fect that the completion of a project could be delayed thereby was inherent 
in the review of legality of decisions over such projects and justified by the 
objectives of the Aarhus Convention; in particular, Article 11 could not be 
rendered redundant for situations already existing before its implementation 
deadline based merely on this potential disadvantage.
8
 
The Court’s distinction between the scope of application of the duty to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment and the provision on access to 
justice is justified if one considers that an impact assessment can indeed af-
fect the way in which a project is executed, in particular since its results 
must be taken into account in the final authorizing decision. In the case of 
access to justice, however, the only question is who may initiate judicial 
review of a project without affecting the substance of a project or pre-
existing legal situations, since there is no right not to have administrative 
decisions reviewed by a court.
9
 
                                                 
3
  Case C-72/12, Gemeinde Altrip, Judgment of 7 November 2013, not yet reported. 
4
  An amended version of Article 10a of Directive 85/337, OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
5
  Para 22. 
6
  Para 26. 
7
  Para 27. 
8
  Paras 28-29. 
9
  A. Epiney, Zur Rechtsprechung des EuGH im Umweltrecht im Jahr 2013, EurUP 2014 
(1) p. 53, 56. 
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2.2. Specific acts of national legislation and the non-
applicability of the obligations under the Aarhus Conven-
tion 
Article 1 (5) of Directive 85/337
10
 provides that its requirements are not 
applicable to projects adopted by a “specific act of national legislation”, as 
the objectives would thus be achieved through the necessary legislative pro-
cess. In Boxus
11
 the problem arose that as a consequence of such a procedure 
no judicial remedy was available which caused concern as to the effective-
ness of Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and Article 10a of the Directive 
as the latter’s implementing provision. 
The Court held that the exclusion from applicability of Article 1 (5) could 
only cover projects that met two conditions, first that its details are adopted 
by a specific legislative act and second that the objectives of the Directive 
must be achieved through the legislative process.
12
 The relevant legislative 
act would thus have to consider all the elements of the project relevant to the 
environmental impact assessment
13
 and no adoption of further measures had 
to be required for the developer to be entitled to proceed with the project.
14
 
As regards the second condition, the legislature must have sufficient infor-
mation at its disposal when the project is adopted.
15
 A two-stage legislative 
procedure during which the legislature can take advantage of the information 
gathered during a prior administrative procedure was considered in principle 
admissible.
16
 However, a legislative act could not fall under the exception of 
Article 1 (5) of the Directive if it only “ratifies” a pre-existing administra-
tive act and merely refers to overriding reasons in the general interest with-
out any substantive legislative process.
17
 As a consequence, the Court de-
termined that in such a case where the exception for specific legislative acts 
was not applicable it would deprive Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention and 
Article 10a of the Directive of all effectiveness if such an act was by no 
                                                 
10
  OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
11
  Cases C-128-131/09 and C-134-135/09, Boxus [2011] ECR I-9711. 
12
  Para 37. 
13
  Para 39. 
14
  Para 40. 
15
  Para 43. Based on the Directive, the minimum information includes “a description of the 
project comprising information on the site, design and size of the project, a description of 
the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse 
effects, and the data required to identify and assess the main effects which the project is 
likely to have on the environment”. 
16
  Para 44. 
17
  Para 45. 
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means amenable to judicial review.
18
 The guarantee of access to justice 
therefore cannot be circumvented by a merely “formal” legislative proce-
dure.
19
 
2.3. Interim relief and the effet utile of provisions on access to 
justice 
In Križan and others20 the Court was asked whether access to justice as 
granted under Article 25 of Directive 2010/75
21
 included a possibility for 
members of the public to ask the court or the competent independent and 
impartial body established by law to order interim measures of a nature to 
temporarily suspend the application of a permit. 
The Court held that the right to bring an action in the Directive had to be 
read in the light of the objective of that Directive, i.e. to achieve integrated 
prevention and control of pollution by putting in place measures designed to 
prevent or reduce emissions of listed activities.
22
 However, the full effec-
tiveness of the right to bring an action could not be achieved if an installa-
tion which had been granted a permit in violation of the Directive could not 
be prevented from continuing to function pending a definitive decision on 
the contested permit.
23
 Consequently, interim relief had to be provided, as 
the Court had already established was necessary for national courts seised of 
a dispute involving EU law to ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment 
to be given on rights claimed under EU law.
24
 
The general wording chosen by the Court indicates that these findings are 
more broadly applicable. It is highly likely that the corresponding provisions 
of Directive 2011/92
25
 on environmental impact assessments are to be inter-
preted similarly, since the Directive also addresses the prevention of envi-
ronmental pollution as an objective.
26
 Moreover, for the Court interim pro-
                                                 
18
  Para 53. 
19
  A. Epiney, Zur Rechtsprechung des EuGH im Umweltrecht im Jahr 2011, EurUP 2012 
(2) p. 88, 93. Also, it is remarkable that the Court bases itself constantly on both Article 
9 of the Convention and Article 10a of the Directive together, which is most likely due 
to the practically identical wording of the two provisions. 
20
  Case C-416/10, Križan and others, Judgment of 15 January 2013, not yet reported.  
21
  OJ 2010 L 334/17. At issue in the case was actually the predecessor provision, Article 
15a of Directive 96/61 (OJ 1996, L 257/26), which is, however, phrased identically. 
22
  Para 108. 
23
  Para 109. 
24
  Para 107. 
25
  OJ 2012 L 26/1. 
26
  Epiney, supra note 8 at p. 54. 
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tection must be provided for in national procedural law whenever, based on 
EU law, judicial remedies have to be granted to review the compatibility of 
administrative decisions with EU law or national implementing law. This 
conclusion is of particular importance for Member States which pursue a 
rather objective approach to judicial protection in administrative law and 
therefore tend to not grant interim protection broadly.
27
 
2.4. The possible pleas for judicial review 
As part of the right to access to justice, the Court was also confronted 
with the question whether before a court an individual could complain not 
only about a missing environmental impact assessment, but also about an 
irregular execution of such an assessment. In Gemeinde Altrip
28
 the Court 
decided that the relevant provision of EU law, the predecessor provision of 
Article 11 of Directive 2011/92,
29
 restricted in no way the pleas that could 
be put forward; the national implementing law could therefore not restrict 
itself to challenges of a decision because of the lack of an environmental 
assessment and exclude cases where such an assessment was found to be 
vitiated by defects; this would otherwise render largely nugatory the relevant 
provisions of EU law.
30
 To decide otherwise would clearly run counter to the 
objectives pursued by the Directive. 
2.5. The role of procedural errors 
A further open question tackled by the CJEU is to what extent access to 
justice can be denied in the case of a procedural error that could not have 
had any effect on the decision ultimately taken and did not affect in any way 
the substantive legal position of the applicant. In Gemeinde Altrip the Court 
decided based on the relevant provision of EU law
31
 that Member States 
could make the admissibility of an action conditional either on the applicant 
having a sufficient interest in bringing the action or on her maintaining the 
impairment of a right in their national legislation.
32
 However, in accordance 
with the principle of effectiveness the relevant procedural rules could not 
make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights con-
                                                 
27
  Id. at p. 54. 
28
  Case C-72/12, Gemeinde Altrip, Judgment of 7 November 2013, not yet reported.  
29
  Article 10a of Directive 85/337, OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
30
  Paras 36-37. 
31
  Article 10a of Directive 85/337, OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
32
  Para 42. 
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ferred by Union law.
33
 Procedural defects must thus be available at least as a 
matter of principle as a possible plea. Nonetheless, based on the significant 
discretion granted by the Directive to Member States to determine what con-
stituted an impairment of a right, the Court found a national rule acceptable 
which did not consider the rights of an individual impaired where a proce-
dural defect could not conceivably influence through its invocation the con-
tested decision and thus excluded access to justice.
34
 However, the burden of 
proof for showing the potential influence of a defect on the ultimate decision 
could not be imposed on the applicant.
35
 The relevant assessment had to be 
undertaken by the competent court, taking into account the seriousness of 
the defect invoked and the extent to which that defect has deprived the pub-
lic concerned of one of the guarantees of access to information and partici-
pation in decision-making in accordance with the objectives of the Di-
rective.
36
 
As a result of the Court’s conclusions, national law can require that at the 
merits phase only the same impairments of rights can be claimed as at the 
phase of admissibility. Furthermore, despite the discretion Member States 
enjoy in defining such “rights”, they must ensure that such rights as are 
granted by Union law can be enforced in court, which includes for the Court 
in particular rights resulting from the provisions of the Aarhus Convention 
and the relevant Union legislation on public participation; only rarely will it 
be possible to find sufficient proof to be able to exclude procedural defects 
in this case because they could in no way impact on the final decision.
37
 
2.6. The notion of “not prohibitively expensive” costs of pro-
ceedings 
Article 9 (4) of the Convention and the corresponding implementing pro-
visions of EU law
38
 require that as part of access to justice as granted by the 
Aarhus Convention, costs for proceedings must not be prohibitively high. In 
Edwards and Pallikaropoulos,
39
 the Court found that this certainly would 
                                                 
33
  Para 45. 
34
  Para 51. 
35
  Para 52. 
36
  Paras 53-54. 
37
  Epiney, supra note 8 at p. 56 et seq. 
38
  Article 10a of Directive 85/337 (OJ 1985 L 175/40) and Article 15a of Directive 96/61 
(OJ 1996, L 257/26) as codified in Article 11 (4) of Directive 2011/92 (OJ 2012 L 26/1) 
and Article 16 (4) of Directive 2008/1 (OJ 2008 L 24/8), respectively. 
39
  Case C-260/11, Edwards and Pallikaropoulos, Judgment of 11 April 2013, not yet re-
ported. 
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not prevent a court from ordering one party to bear the costs.
40
 The question 
whether costs are prohibitive calls for an overall assessment, taking into ac-
count all the costs borne by the party concerned.
41
 Considering the objective 
of the pertinent EU legislation to give to the public concerned wide access to 
justice, the right to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the Union as well as the principle of effective-
ness and, lastly, the Implementation Guide published in 2000 by the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
42
 the cost of judicial proceed-
ings ought not to be prohibitively expensive in as much as the relevant per-
sons “should not be prevented from seeking, or pursuing a claim for, a re-
view by the courts that falls within the scope of those articles by reason of 
the financial burden that might arise as a result.”43 According to the Court, 
to achieve this objective a national court has to take into account all the rel-
evant provisions of national law, in particular legal aid schemes or costs pro-
tection regimes.
44
 
The Court insisted that an objective and subjective assessment ought to be 
undertaken, since both the interest of the person wishing to defend her rights 
and the public interest in the protection of the environment had to be taken 
into account.
45
 Thus, the national court’s assessment could not be carried out 
solely on the basis of the financial situation of the person concerned and 
whether the costs of proceedings exceeded her resources, but also required 
an objective analysis of the amount of costs. The latter analysis should as-
sess whether the costs would appear objectively unreasonable, given that 
members of the public and associations are “naturally required” to play an 
active role in defending the environment.
46
 In the framework of the analysis 
of the financial situation of the person concerned, the national court should 
not use the estimated resources of an “average” applicant;47 legitimate crite-
ria are, however, the reasonableness of the prospect of success, the im-
portance of what is at stake for the claimant and for the protection of the 
environment, the complexity of the relevant law and procedure and the po-
tentially frivolous nature of a claim.
48
 The fact that the claimant has not been 
deterred in practice to bring her claim cannot be considered sufficient proof 
                                                 
40
  Para 25. 
41
  Para 28. 
42
  Paras 31, 33 and 34. 
43
  Para 35. 
44
  Para 38. 
45
  Para 39. 
46
  Para 40. 
47
  Para 41. 
48
  Para 42. 
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that the proceedings are not prohibitively expensive.
49
 Also, there cannot be 
a different assessment based on whether a court is adjudicating at the level 
of first-instance proceedings, an appeal or even second appeal.
50
 
While some guidance is thus given on the criteria for acceptable costs of 
proceedings, some of said criteria remain quite open, such as the criterion of 
“objective reasonableness”. The considerable differences between the Mem-
ber States as to the costs of proceedings are also unlikely to be affected by 
the decision, since the Court admits several criteria apart from the financial 
situation of the party concerned. This conclusion permits – and in some cas-
es may even require – a case-by-case assessment of what constitute prohibi-
tively expensive costs.
51
  
Lastly, it remains unclear after the CJEU’s decision whether the obliga-
tion to prevent proceedings from becoming prohibitively expensive implies 
simultaneously that Member States have to provide for a functional system 
of legal aid. The Court’s insistence that applicants should not be deterred 
from pursuing their claims before a court, however, points in the direction 
that such an effective legal aid scheme must be available.
52
 
2.7. Access to justice for environmental associations under Arti-
cle 9 (2) Aarhus Convention 
In a first decision in Djurgarden-Lilla
53
 the Court had to discuss a number 
of questions relating to the right of action for environmental associations as 
provided in Article 9 (2) of the Convention. It first held that public participa-
tion in environmental decision-making and legal review had a different pur-
pose, and that as a consequence access to a review procedure could not be 
made dependent by Member States in any way on whether an individual had 
taken part and expressed its views during the public participation phase of a 
project.
54
 
A clear distinction has also to be drawn according to the Court between 
actions by individuals and actions by nongovernmental organisations; the 
latter also have to be granted access justice if they fulfil the requirements set 
out in national law.
55
 Consequently, an obligation to introduce or maintain a 
                                                 
49
  Para 43. 
50
  Para 45. 
51
  Epiney, supra note 8 at p. 55. 
52
  Id. 
53
  Case C-263/08, Djurgarden Lilla [2009] ECR I-9967. 
54
  Para 39. 
55
  Paras 34-35. 
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right of action for environmental organisations can be derived from Di-
rective 2011/92 and its predecessors,
56
 respectively.
57
 
The Court also clarified the margin of discretion that Member States en-
joy to impose requirements on such nongovernmental organisations with 
respect to their access to justice. The national rules must in particular ensure 
wide access to justice and render effective the respective provisions of the 
Directive.
58
 National law may require that an association has as its object the 
protection of the environment.
59
 In principle, it would also be conceivable 
that such associations must have a minimum number of members; however, 
this minimum number must not be fixed in a way contrary to the objectives 
of the Directive.
60
 Fixing the minimum number at 2000 members was found 
contrary to the Directive, since the latter concerned not only projects on a 
regional or national, but also the local scale, which would mean local associ-
ations would be excluded from access to justice.
61
 Furthermore, the Court 
considered it inacceptable that smaller associations would have to contact 
larger associations and ask them to bring an appeal, as this might lead to a 
system of “filtering” of appeals incompatible with the objectives of the D i-
rective.
62
 
It seems clear after this judgment that a system which only grants full ac-
cess to justice to environmental associations at the national level is incom-
patible with the Directive. Moreover, the criteria established in national law 
may only serve to scrutinize environmental associations as to their “serious-
ness”, by examining e.g. their actual existence, the pursuit of relevant goals 
and probably durability. By contrast, Member States must not “filter” them 
according to other criteria.
63
 
Some further elements have been added to the interpretation of Article 9 
(2) and the pertinent provisions of EU law in Bund für Umwelt und Na-
turschutz Deutschland,
64
 which concerned the question whether a national 
law could make the access to justice for environmental associations depend-
ent upon whether a violation of a norm providing rights for individuals was 
at stake. The starting point for the Court were the predecessor provision of 
                                                 
56
  Directive 85/337, OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
57
  A. Epiney, Zur Rechtsprechung des EuGH im Umweltrecht im Jahr 2009, EurUP 2010 
(3) p. 134, 136. 
58
  Case C-263/08, Djurgarden Lilla [2009] ECR I-9967, para 45. 
59
  Para 46. 
60
  Para 47. 
61
  Para 50. 
62
  Para 51. 
63
  Epiney, supra note 52 at p. 137. 
64
  Case C-115/09, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland [2011] ECR I-3673. 
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Article 11 of Directive 2011/92
65
 as an implementation measure of the Aar-
hus Convention and the latter’s objective, which support an interpretation 
that, whichever criteria for the admissibility of an action a Member State 
chooses, environmental associations are entitled to a review procedure be-
fore a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by 
law to challenge relevant decisions based on substantive or procedural 
grounds.
66
 The Court therefore accepted that the national legislature could 
confine to “individual public-law rights” the rights whose infringement may 
be relied on by individuals in legal proceedings contesting a decision; how-
ever, such a limitation could not be applied to environmental associations 
without disregarding the objective of the Directive.
67
 It would be contrary to 
the principle of effectiveness to prevent such associations from access to 
justice in the case of impairment of EU rules protecting only the public in-
terest and not interests of individuals, as this would largely deprive these 
associations of the possibility of verifying compliance with the directly ap-
plicable rules of EU environmental law and the provisions of national law 
implementing EU environmental law.
68
  
Before the background that the national rule at issue could not be inter-
preted in a way compatible with EU law, the Court went on to confirm the 
direct effect of the second and third sentence of Article 11 of the Directive 
which state that the interest of any non-governmental organisation meeting 
the respective requirements are to be deemed sufficient and that such organi-
sations are to be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired.
69
 
The Court thereby interprets the access to justice to be granted to envi-
ronmental associations very broadly; the latter must be able to bring before a 
court or similar body any violation of the national provisions implementing 
EU law or of directly applicable provisions of EU environmental law. This 
implies simultaneously that the courts must be able to scrutinize the merits 
of such claims, which means that the extent of their powers of judicial re-
view must correspond to the breadth of access to justice granted under the 
Directive. This approach is convincing, as otherwise the right of action of 
environmental associations would never be more extensively granted than 
the same right for individuals and would therefore lose all practical signifi-
cance of its own, despite the clear distinction in the wording of the Directive 
and of Article 9 (2) of the Aarhus Convention.
70
 
                                                 
65
  Article 10a of Directive 85/337, OJ 1985 L 175/40. 
66
  Para 42. 
67
  Para 45. 
68
  Para 46. 
69
  Para 57. 
70
  Epiney, supra note 18 at p. 90 et seq. 
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The decision also strengthens the previously mentioned obligation for 
Member States of introducing or maintaining a right of action for environ-
mental associations. However, the Court correctly limits the extent of this 
obligation to national norms which are based on EU environmental law and 
to directly applicable norms of EU environmental law. This limitation corre-
sponds to the limited competence of the EU which cannot regulate questions 
of access to justice in areas not covered by EU law. The respective compe-
tence of the EU is based here on the fact that procedural rules serve the ef-
fective implementation and application of EU law in the present case. Based 
on Article 192 TFEU as a legal basis it would be in principle conceivable to 
regulate questions of access to justice – including the topic of a right of ac-
tion for environmental associations – for all or several areas of EU environ-
mental law in a comprehensive legal act. However, the introduction of a 
general right of action for environmental associations would not be covered 
on this legal basis, since such a right of action would apply to purely nation-
al areas of environmental law as well. The EU competence to regulate ques-
tions of the execution and of judicial remedies in this area has thus mere 
annex character.
71
 
Nonetheless, the Court’s approach leaves three questions unanswered. 
First, the notion of norms of EU environmental law and of national laws that 
serve its implementation or execution is not clarified. Clearly, this encom-
passes all legal acts taken based on Article 192 TFEU. However, since envi-
ronmental protection is treated as a mainstreaming issue in the Treaty
72
 and 
environmental concerns thus ought to play an important role also in the field 
of other EU policies, arguably EU norms should already be considered to 
fall within the field of environmental protection if their content and/or ob-
jectives concern among others environmental issues, which could be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
73
 
Second, there are no clear criteria to identify when a national norm is im-
plementing EU environmental law. Large parts of national environmental 
law are nowadays determined to some extent by EU law. If the limits of 
competences ought to be respected, only those provisions of national law are 
to be considered that are indeed based on EU law insofar as they implement 
requirements of EU law; these include, however, also EU fundamental rights 
or the general principles of EU environmental law. In individual cases, there 
may appear difficulties in delineating what part of a norm is determined by 
EU law, e.g. in the case of rather vaguely formulated requirements of EU 
                                                 
71
  See already on this topic A. Epiney, Gemeinschaftsrecht und Verbandsklage, NVwZ 
1999 p. 485, 490 et seq. 
72
  See Articles 114 (3) and 11 TFEU. 
73
  Epiney, supra note 18 at p. 91. 
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law. In case of doubt, arguably even situations where the national legislature 
implements “more” than EU law prescribes precisely should be treated as 
being covered by EU law; it is certainly impossible to treat parts of one 
norm as implementation of EU law while rejecting the same for other parts 
of the same norm.
74
  
A third question arises for the national legislator as to whether two differ-
ent regimes for the right of action for environmental associations ought to 
coexist, one for claims under EU law-determined situations and another for 
claims under national law. There is arguably a good case against such a dif-
ferent treatment. Not only are there hardly any good reasons to grant prefer-
ential access to justice in the first case and not in the second one; the men-
tioned difficulties of distinguishing situations determined by EU law from 
others also do not arise in the first place as a consequence.
75
 
2.8. Access to justice for environmental associations under Arti-
cle 9 (3) Aarhus Convention 
In Lesoochranarske
76
 the Court had to examine whether a direct right to 
bring a claim for environmental associations could be derived from Article 9 
(3) of the Convention. Although the EU had not implemented the provision, 
the Court found itself competent to interpret Article 9 (3) based on the Habi-
tats Directive
77
 which protected the species relevant to the case.
78
 However, 
as a hardly surprising finding the Court decided that Article 9 (3) had no 
direct effect, since it did not contain a sufficiently clear and precise obliga-
tion.
79
 Nonetheless, in areas covered by EU law – here the Habitats Di-
rective – the national court had to interpret national law including the proce-
dural rules in a way which to the fullest extent possible was consistent with 
the aim of Article 9 (3) of the Convention to grant effective access to justice, 
which in this case meant to enable an environmental protection organisation 
to challenge before a court an administrative procedure liable to be in breach 
of EU environmental law.
80
 
                                                 
74
  Id. at p. 91 et seq. 
75
  Id. at p. 92. 
76
  Case C-240/09, Lesoochranarske [2011] ECR I-1255. 
77
  Directive 92/43, OJ 1992 L 206/7. 
78
  Case C-240/09, Lesoochranarske [2011] ECR I-1255, para 37. See also on this aspect of 
the case S. Schlacke, Stärkung überindividuellen Rechtsschutzes zur Durchsetzung des 
Umweltrechts – zugleich Anmerkung zu EuGH, Urteil vom 8.3.2011 – Rs. C-240/09, 
ZUR 2011, p. 312, 313 et seq. 
79
  Para 45. 
80
  Paras 50-51. 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice on Access to Justice 
14 
 
The Court thus finds that despite the lack of direct effect a provision of an 
international treaty remains relevant for the Member States in areas covered 
by EU law, which means that they have to interpret their national law in 
conformity with such a provision. However, the fact remains that Article 9 
(3) of the Convention grants substantive discretion to Member States. For 
claims of individuals, admissibility can thus be made dependent upon the 
fulfilment of additional criteria such as the existence of a sufficient interest 
or impairment of a right, as long as access to justice is not excluded as a 
matter of principle. For environmental organisations, however, the Court 
indicates that at least a full-scale exclusion of the access to justice in areas 
where compliance with EU environmental law is at stake is not in compli-
ance with Article 9 (3) of the Convention. This provision thus has important 
implications for Member States which had not necessarily been foreseen in 
the doctrine
81
 and requires the latter to introduce a right to bring an action 
for environmental associations. Such a duty goes arguably beyond creating a 
right of action in the case of permit decisions for certain dangerous activities 
or activities subject to an environmental impact assessment and would in-
deed implicate that the implementation of Article 9 (3) of the Convention is 
replaced by an EU legal act, at least as far as the requirement to introduce 
such a right of action to claim a violation of EU environmental law or its 
implementing national law is concerned. Nonetheless, with the Court’s ra-
ther terse reasoning it is not clear yet whether there will not be further de-
velopments on this question.
82
 
2.9. Annulment of a permit and the right to property 
In Križan and others83 the Court was confronted with the claim that the 
annulment of a permit in the context of proceedings under the national pro-
visions implementing Article 9 (2) and 9 (4) of the Aarhus Convention and 
the respective EU Directive
84
 would constitute an unjustified interference 
with the right to property of the developer as enshrined in Article 17 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court held that the right to property was 
not absolute and could be restricted based on objectives of general interest 
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and in a proportionate fashion.
85
 Recognising that the protection of the envi-
ronment could constitute such a general interest, the Court then rather quick-
ly accepted the proportionality of the restriction caused by the Directive 
based on the fact that the latter “operates a balance” between the right to 
property and the protection of the environment.
86
 
The result is in principle convincing. The contextual remarks of the Court 
also lead to the conclusion that in a case where a permit has been found by a 
court to have been granted in violation of a directive or its national imple-
menting measures the annulment of said permit is not only optional, but 
compulsory because of the effectiveness of EU law.
87
 At the same time, the 
Court’s reasoning remains deplorably terse when examining the proportion-
ality of the Directive. The Court does not distinguish between the prongs of 
suitability, necessity and proportionality stricto sensu. This approach is ra-
ther frequently found and criticised in cases where the Court is asked to re-
view secondary legislation against the benchmark of primary law.
88
 
3. Implications for Switzerland 
While Switzerland has ratified the Aarhus Convention on March 3
rd
 
2014,
89
 the country is nonetheless no Member State of the EU and therefore 
not directly bound by the case law of the CJEU. Nonetheless, the dicta of the 
Court are indirectly relevant for Switzerland. 
First, as a party Switzerland is in any event bound by the provisions of 
the Aarhus Convention. The way in which the CJEU interprets said provi-
sions is of course not binding for Switzerland. But under international law, 
the judgments handed down by national high courts and international and 
supranational courts are to be considered at least as important leads for the 
interpretation of treaty provisions. As a result of this, not even taking into 
consideration these interpretations would be hard to justify e.g. in the 
framework of interpreting the Aarhus Convention in Switzerland. Article 31 
(3) b of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties explicitly specifies 
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that the “subsequent practice” of parties to a treaty is to be taken into ac-
count in the interpretation of said treaty, which includes in particular binding 
judicial pronouncements.
90
 Furthermore, the Aarhus Convention has been 
concluded in the framework of the United Nations Economic Conference for 
Europe, which means that a practice taken by the 28 EU Member States is of 
particular significance in this regional context. Taking these points into ac-
count, only very good or even compelling reasons appear to be able to justi-
fy that Switzerland deviates from the CJEU’s case law in interpreting the 
Aarhus Convention. The case would be even stronger if the Court’s interpre-
tation aligns with that of the Compliance Committee which controls compli-
ance with the Convention based on Article 15 of the latter and issues non-
binding statements on its interpretation. Such statements are not only rele-
vant for interpretations given by the Court on provisions of the Convention 
itself, but also for provisions of EU secondary law which mirror the Conven-
tion’s wording. The Court also bases its reasoning in the latter cases on the 
corresponding objectives and provisions of the Aarhus Convention that the 
EU legislator wanted to transpose.
91
 
Second, if a new bilateral agreement on electricity between the EU and 
Switzerland would be concluded, the obligations of the EU Directives on 
environmental impact assessments and integrated pollution prevention could 
become applicable for Switzerland as well.
92
 It is conceivable that the inter-
pretation of the CJEU of these legal acts would thus have to be followed by 
Switzerland, too, although the exact extent of such an obligation of parallel 
interpretation could only be examined based on the actual agreement.
93
 The 
EU for its part is likely to insist for future agreements to ensure as far as 
possible an identical legal situation in Switzerland compared to that of EU 
Member States, which also includes the relevant jurisprudence of the 
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CJEU.
94
 Cases such as Lesoochranarkse are more complicated in this regard, 
as they concern the implications of Article 9 (3) of the Convention as part of 
an international treaty of the EU and not an act of EU secondary legislation. 
Only an analysis of a future bilateral agreement could show whether such 
cases could be relevant for Switzerland and its interpretation of the Conven-
tion in a similar fashion.
95
 
Although these questions remain open, some examples concerning con-
crete norms of the Swiss legal order can already now be raised in the light of 
the CJEU’s findings on Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention. Article 55 Um-
weltschutzgesetz (USG, Law on Environmental Protection) provides for a 
right of action for environmental associations concerning administrative 
procedures concerning the planning, construction or change of installations 
that require an environmental impact assessment. In principle, this right of 
action should satisfy the requirements the Court set out in Djurgarden Lilla 
and more extensively in Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, 
although the exclusion from the scope of application of the USG of radioac-
tive substances and ionising radiation leaves some doubts in this regard.
96
 
After having ratified the Convention, it seems convincing to argue that Swit-
zerland can no longer amend Article 55 USG as to the right of action for 
environmental associations because of its international obligations. A paral-
lel duty to abstain from amendments would arise if the EU directives on en-
vironmental impact assessment and integrated pollution prevention would 
become applicable. Furthermore, after the CJEU’s statements in Djurgarden 
Lilla it seems more than doubtful that the requirement established in Article 
55 (1) USG that an environmental association must be active at the national 
level (“gesamtschweizerisch tätig”) to be granted the right of action com-
plies with the Convention. Also, the limitation of Article 55 (2) USG that the 
right to action is only open to associations if the relevant area has been cov-
ered by the association’s objectives may be excessive and go beyond what is 
necessary to verify the mere seriousness of the association as stated by the 
CJEU. Moreover, it would also need to be assessed in the light of the find-
ings in Djurgarden Lilla whether no inadmissible link is drawn between the 
public participation in permit proceedings and the following access to justice 
of such associations. Ultimately, the reach of Article 9 (3) of the Convention 
as set out in Lesoochranarske is questionable as to its impact on Swiss envi-
ronmental law. While the decision can partly be understood as based on the 
                                                 
94
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specificity of EU law which perceives international treaties concluded by the 
EU as an integral part of its legal order,
97
 there remain some general remarks 
of the Court that are also relevant for Switzerland. First, direct effect of the 
provision would likely also have been excluded by the Swiss Federal Su-
preme Court which uses criteria similar to those of the CJEU in its respec-
tive case law.
98
 Second, in Lesoochranarske the Court interprets Article 9 
(3) to signify that states have to introduce as a matter of principle a right of 
action for environmental associations which the latter can use to claim a vio-
lation of environmental norms of national law. Based on the text of the pro-
vision and its full effectiveness this obligation necessarily must go beyond 
the possibility of granting a right of action for decisions falling under Article 
6 of the Aarhus Convention. In Switzerland, Article 12 Bundesgesetz über 
den Natur- und Heimatschutz provides for a broadly phrased right of action 
for environmental associations in matters of nature and heritage protection, 
which – taken together with the mentioned right of action under Article 55 
USG – probably meets this requirement. Nonetheless, more research would 
be needed as to whether some lacunae remain and whether they amount to a 
violation of the Aarhus Convention.
99
 
4. Conclusions 
The CJEU has contributed to quite some extent to an emerging acquis 
under the Aarhus Convention. In a number of cases, the Court clarified the 
sometimes vague provisions of the Convention and at some points gave teeth 
to provisions that the doctrine had previously judged as not containing 
strong obligations, as the case of Article 9 (3) of the Convention shows. 
Nonetheless, many questions remain open, such as the boundaries of what 
constitutes EU environmental law and national law implementing EU envi-
ronmental law in order to assess the realm within which the strict require-
ments of Article 9 (2) of the Convention concerning the right of action for 
environmental associations apply. Others have yet to be addressed or to be 
addressed in more detail, as the example of subjective and objective ap-
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proaches to assessing whether costs of proceedings are prohibitively expen-
sive shows; in this case the Court stopped short of explaining the notion of 
“objective reasonableness”. Even for non-Member States of the EU such as 
Switzerland, the Court’s dicta should arguably not be ignored, not only be-
cause generally interpretations given to international treaties like the Con-
vention by high national and international courts are relevant under the cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of international law, but also because in the 
future some of the EU directives interpreted in these cases by the CJEU 
could become binding for Switzerland in the framework of a new bilateral 
agreement. 
 
